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Abstract: In 1908, the American Sugar Refining Company 
(ASR) reversed its long-held policy of secrecy as to its 
financial condition and performance. Prior work, applying 
contemporary capital market methods to ASR security price 
data of that period, has suggested a value to ASR 
shareholders of this policy reversal. This paper examines 
the historical record of that time and presents additional 
evidence on this matter, particularly in terms of identifying 
potentially confounding events occurring during the period 
under study. The results of this analysis suggest a difficulty 
in attributing observed abnormal returns to ASR's secrecy 
policy reversal on the basis of the results obtained from 
applying capital markets methods. This analysis is useful 
for scholars interested in applying modern capital market 
methods to historical data. It highlights the significance of 
the possible effects of contemporaneous historical events, 
focuses attention on the importance of a deep understanding 
of the historical period studied, and suggests a value in 
combining historical and empirical-markets methods to 
gain a richer understanding of the events and conditions in 
the time period under study. 
The application of modern capital markets methods to explore 
accounting issues in historical time periods has attracted increased 
interest in recent years. One such study, Porter et al, (1995) (hereafter 
PSW) examine the effects of American Sugar Refining's (ASR's) 1908 
reversal of a financial secrecy policy to determine the value of voluntary 
disclosure per se and voluntary disclosure policy. They find in part, 
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using traditional capital markets methods and an event window around 
the time of the secrecy policy reversal, positive abnormal returns for 
ASR stock. These findings lead them to conclude that the secrecy policy 
reversal had measurable value to ASR stockholders. Narrowly, the 
purpose of this paper is to assess these findings and to consider whether 
other chronologically proximate events and conditions could plausibly 
have affected the valuation of American Sugar securities. Broadly, this 
paper seeks to address the use of data in capital markets studies of 
historical time periods, and the interpretation of results derived in such 
studies. Not addressed in this paper are underlying issues related to 
institutional arrangements, acceptable trading practices, and other 
matters pertinent to the issue of market efficiency during this historical 
period. We are not challenging the assumption that ASR security pricing 
was efficient with respect to publicly available information. Readers 
interested in studying issues of this period related to market efficiency 
are referred to Previts and Bricker (1994). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review 
the PSW study and summarize the historical events amidst which it is 
set, these being the illness and death of H.O. Havemeyer, the long time 
President of ASR, the succession of a new president, and the company's 
annual meeting at which time ASR formally announced the reversal of 
its long-held financial secrecy policy. Several research issues pertinent 
to the PSW study, primarily related to the existence of other possibly 
significant historical events during the period covered by PSW, are 
identified. We then provide a contextual, historical analysis of 
contemporaneous events and conditions of the period and use this as a 
basis for evaluating the PSW study of ASR. Particular attention is 
focused on events reported in the financial press that may have affected 
ASR security pricing, dates on which press reports related to ASR's 
financial secrecy policy are published, and the period of uncertainty 
surrounding the succession to the ASR Presidency that occurred 
following Havemeyer's death. Next, using the PSW data and methods, 
tests extending the original PSW analysis are conducted based on the 
results of our historical analysis. Following a presentation and discussion 
of these results, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
opportunities and difficulties of applying capital markets methods to data 
from historical time periods. 
2
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ISSUES 
The PSW study follows a line of research that has applied 
contemporary capital markets methods and models to data from 
historical time periods. Prior work has included Chow (1983) and 
Sivakumar and Waymire (1993 and 1994). The focus of these studies on 
historical time periods makes them interesting and appealing. Chow's 
work, however, has been specifically criticized by Merino et al (1987), 
and Previts and Bricker (1994) argue generally that such studies must 
fully consider historical contextual issues that are essential in both the 
design of such studies and the interpretation of results. 
The PSW study finds that ASR shareholders earned abnormal 
returns as a result of the 1908 reversal of Henry 0. Havemeyer's long-
held financial secrecy policy. As summarized in PSW, Havemeyer, who 
opposed disclosure of any ASR information, died suddenly on December 
4, 1907 after becoming ill on November 28, 1907. Havemeyer's 
successor, W. B. Thomas, "announced the company's intent to reverse 
its long-standing secrecy policy by making periodic reports" (PSW, 
1995, p. 129) at the company's annual meeting on January 8, 1908. On 
March 23, 1908, ASR made its first annual report available to 
shareholders. PSW examine cumulative abnormal returns to ASR 
shareholders for both the secrecy policy reversal on January 8, and the 
publication of the annual report on March 23 (and each preceding day). 
They find a positive wealth effect which is statistically significant for 
three sets of dates: January 8th, January 8th and March 23rd combined, 
and January 7th and 8th and March 21st and 23rd combined. On the basis 
of the abnormal returns of these dates, PSW conclude the existence of a 
value to voluntary reporting - for the first event as related to voluntary 
reporting policy, and for the second event as related to voluntary 
reporting per se, for ASR shareholders. We do not address the value of 
voluntary reporting per se in the remainder of this paper, but rather on 
the issue of a value to a policy of voluntary reporting, as studied by 
PSW in their assessment of the effects of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. 
The PSW study measures ASR returns from September 30th, 1907 
to May 29th, 1908. PSW use a dummy variable is used to measure the 
difference in returns during the event window(s) in comparison to returns 
outside the event window. The event date for the secrecy policy reversal 
(disclosure precommitment date) is defined as January 8, the date on 
which the company's policy reversal was officially announced during its 
annual meeting. The resulting model is significant (p = .023) and they 
find a significant cumulative positive abnormal return of 2.35 percent. 
3
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Several issues not fully addressed in PSW may bear on their results 
and the interpretation thereof, as listed below. 
• The date used by PSW to isolate the financial secrecy policy 
reversal effect (January 8th) is the date of ASR's annual meeting. It 
is conceivable that other potentially significant disclosures may have 
occurred on that date. Such disclosures would raise issues about 
distinguishing ASR's secrecy policy reversal from its voluntary 
reporting, per se, (or other economic effects) as causes of ASR 
security price changes. 
• January 8th is the sole date used by PSW in assessing the 
(separable) effect of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. If, however, 
there are other dates on which ASR's secrecy policy was addressed 
in financial press reports prior to January 8, then such dates should 
also be added to any empirical analysis addressing the effect of the 
secrecy policy reversal on ASR securities. 
• The period of the illness and death of Havemeyer is included by 
PSW as a part of the period for estimating ASR normal returns. 
However, any systematic ASR pricing reaction to Havemeyer's 
passing may influence the PSW results. 
Several research questions arise from these issues. First, is it 
reasonable to attribute any abnormal ASR price effect on January 8th to 
a change in the company's financial secrecy policy, or do other 
disclosures confound such an interpretation? Second, were there other 
dates in addition to January 8th (the date used by PSW) which are 
plausible event dates for assessing the effect of the secrecy policy 
reversal? Third, was there an ASR security price reaction to the 
succession uncertainty that may have occurred with and following the 
illness and death of Havemeyer? If so, would this effect influence PSW's 
findings? 
ANALYSIS 
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we study the events and 
conditions roughly contemporaneous with January 8th to address the 
three questions posed above. Then, using the same data and methods as 
PSW, we conduct additional empirical testing based on the results of our 
first phase of analysis. 
Research question one explores the attribution of the observed ASR 
abnormal return effect to the announcement of the secrecy policy 
4
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reversal, and whether other information released on this date could have 
had information content and have affected ASR security pricing. An 
analysis of the financial press articles of the period in the Financial 
Chronicle, the Wall Street Journal, and the financial section of the New 
York Times raises issues potentially bearing on this matter. Significantly, 
January 8th was not just a date on which ASR announced the reversal of 
the secrecy policy, but (as noted in PSW) was the date of ASR's annual 
meeting. For instance, it was on this day that the company made its 
initial report of its annual operations to shareholders, and also discussed 
other economic and political developments prospectively affecting ASR. 
It appears (and widely believed), for example, that sugar crop and tariff 
announcements were important factors in ASR security pricing. As 
reported on the following day by the Wall Street Journal, management 
discussed several topics during the annual meeting: that the past year had 
been the best that the company had experienced, that the policy of the 
company with new management would be less antagonistic and less 
secret, that various lawsuits would be adjudicated, that sugar crops were 
smaller and prices higher, that labor trouble in Cuba implied a smaller 
crop, and that government statements on tariffs were favorable to ASR. 
All of these reported disclosures, to the extent unanticipated, could be 
expected to increase ASR security prices. Even with the presence of 
some level of anticipation, the elimination of uncertainty accompanying 
the official company announcement would also tend to increase ASR 
security prices and returns. These several potentially significant 
information disclosures confound interpretations of stock price reactions 
for the day and certainly do not lend themselves to an unambiguous 
attribution of the day's abnormal price effect to any single cause. 
Research question two addresses the existence of additional dates 
which may have lead to a market anticipation of a reversal of ASR's 
secrecy policy. We searched financial press reports of the period from 
the date of Havemeyer's illness to the date of the official announcement 
of the policy reversal to identify all days on which the secrecy policy 
reversal of ASR was discussed, implied, or anticipated. We identified the 
following four dates: 
• In The Wall Street Journal of Thursday, December 5th 1907 in an 
article following H. O. Havemeyer's death, it was asserted that 
"(Havemeyer's) policy was not that of publicity, so that he belonged 
to a passing rather than to a new era of corporate finance." This 
assertion implies that Havemeyer's secrecy policy would not survive 
him. 
5
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• In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, December 10th, 1907, the 
following article appeared: "American Sugar Refining Co.: 
Havemeyer's Death Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy 
Policy". 
• In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, January 7th, 1908 in an 
article preceding the next day's annual meeting, it was written that 
". . . it is supposed that the policy of the company will change, the 
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic and less 
secret". 
• In the Wall Street Journal of Wednesday, January 8th, in an article 
published prior to that day's annual meeting, it was written that 
"Friends of (ASR) . . . admit that more publicity in regard to the 
company's affairs would be better policy... President Thomas has 
given his word to this effect... the first step in this direction is 
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President Thomas 
may in his review of the year disclose more information than has 
been given out heretofore." January 8th was also, of course, the date 
of the actual annual meeting at which the financial secrecy policy 
reversal was officially announced later that day (See January 9 -
New York Times). 
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as 
those of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested 
individually for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests 
address the joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both 
voluntary reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. If PSW's hypothesis 
about the value of a voluntary reporting and publicity policy, per se, is 
correct, then we would expect to see positive security price effects on 
each of the event days, with the effect on the 8th being limited to the 
elimination of whatever uncertainty remained regarding reversal of the 
secrecy policy. 
As related to the third research question posed, any analysis of this 
period or interpretation of results requires consideration of any possible 
effect on ASR security prices of the illness and death of Henry 
Havemeyer. Particularly, as described subsequently, if Havemeyer's 
death resulted in a period of uncertainty related to management 
succession, and if that period was included in an estimation window for 
calculating normal ASR returns, then the stationarity assumption of 
PSW's beta estimate would be violated, with the result that in the 
estimation of ASR normal returns would be mathematically biased. 
6
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Specifically, the statistical analysis computing returns in the immediately 
subsequent period would be biased in favor of finding abnormal returns. 
Ha.vemeyer's passing was clearly regarded as a significant event in 
the eyes of ASR, the financial markets, and its shareholders, according 
to financial press accounts of the time. These accounts reflect the belief, 
for example, of an association between Havemeyer's illness and death 
and an ASR's stock price decline that occurred. On December 4th, the 
Wall Street Journal's daily column "Features of the Market" column 
noted "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious illness of 
H.O. Havemeyer". On December 6th, the same column noted that "(t)he 
first transaction in (ASR) was one point below the closing sale of the 
previous day on President Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss 
to the company is a very serious one . . ."On December 12, as ASR's 
common stock price neared its nadir, "Features of the Market" stated that 
"(ASR) selling . . . comes through conservative commission houses . .. 
It is naturally based upon the very tangible loss the company . . . has 
sustained in H.O. Havemeyer's death and represents investment 
holdings." On December 16, the column reported that "Boston has been 
selling the stock since H. 0. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result, 
as investors there had great faith in the late president." An article in 
December 17th's Wall Street Journal stated " . . . One reason advanced 
for the marked decline in the stock is the loss of H.O. Havemeyer, which, 
if be true, is indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the 
American Sugar Refining Company." On January 4th, well into ASR's 
price rebound, and following a day on which the stock closed up over 6 
1/2 points to 107, the "Features of the Market" column noted, "One 
reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real scarcity of the 
stock... It was always a dangerous short sale, and was oversold when 
H. O. Havemeyer died". 
As the matter of succession was not settled at ASR at the time of 
Havemeyer's illness and death, it is plausible to believe that his passing 
initiated a significant process of increasing uncertainty as to management 
succession and ASR prospects. PSW, in contrast, address the possible 
impact of Havemeyer's death from a different perspective: 
" . . . our results may be confounded by Havemeyer's sudden 
death. For example, investors may have expected Havemeyer's 
death to lead to the adoption of a disclosure policy, and 
impounded any wealth effects at that time. Accordingly, we 
investigated ASR stock returns at the time of Havemeyer's 
death. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
7
Bricker and Brown: Use of historical data in accounting research: The case of the American Sugar Refining Company
Published by eGrove, 1997
8 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
favorable effects of the subsequent policy reversal were 
capitalized when Havemeyer died; the market adjusted return 
on the date of his death was -2.26 percent. No large price 
movements were observed in adjacent days." (PSW, 1995, p. 
136-137) 
PSW, then, focus on the possibility that the death of Havemeyer 
itself may have signaled a reversal of the secrecy policy, and so test for 
a positive abnormal return effect. But they do not examine an alternative 
possibility that an uncertainty-increasing process began at the date of 
Havemeyer's illness regarding management succession and ASR 
prospects and concluded at ASR's announcement of his successor, 
resulting in a negative abnormal return effect for the period. 
Chronologically, this succession-uncertainty process occurred 
several weeks prior to ASR's annual meeting and the formally 
announced reversal of the secrecy policy. Havemeyer's sickness began 
November 29th (he died December 4), and W.B. Thomas was announced 
as his successor on December 20th. A visual inspection of Figure 1, 
which is reproduced from PSW, shows that ASR returns turned negative 
about the time of Havemeyer's sickness and death, and remained 
negative until the December 20th announcement regarding W.B. 
Thomas. 
FIGURE 1 
ASR Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns 
(Reprinted from Porter et al [1995]) 
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns on ASR Common Stock from Late 
November 1907 to Late March 1908 
8
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decline in ASR returns during this period, it does provide prima facia 
evidence of a decline in ASR security prices as well as an analyst and 
press belief that this was so. Such an effect, as described above, would 
bias an analysis of abnormal returns on January 8th in favor of a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Specific empirical tests on this are 
described later in the paper. 
The empirical portion of our analysis began with a replication of a 
portion of PSW in order to establish comparability with its data and 
methods. Using the same parameters and process for selecting a data set, 
and duplicating the general model employed by PSW, we tested for a 
price effect on January 8th, the date of the financial secrecy policy 
reversal. Following PSW we employed a dummy variable for the date of 
January 8th as the secrecy policy reversal event date, and used the 
railroad index to proxy for the market. The results, shown in Table 1, 
Panel A, compare the PSW results (Item 1) with our replication (Item 2); 
The results are generally consistent, including an event-variable 
coefficient (probability) of .0235 (.023) and .0237 (.026) respectively. 
Therefore, we are comfortable that our data and method fairly closely 
approximates those of PSW. 
Table 1 
Estimation Results for Event Parameter Models 
Panel A 
Single Event Models 
Description (event dates) ά ά(t) β β(t) δ δ(t) δ(p) r2 CAR% 
(1) Porter Results .008 1.11.833 12.18.0235 2.29.023.436 2.35 
(1/8/08) 
(2) Replication Results .001 .91.798 11.31 .0237 2.24.026.387 2.37 
(1/8/08) 
(3) Four Event Dates Results .001 1.21 .796 11.16 -.0061 -1.14 .250 .386 -2.45 
(12/5/07,12/10/07, 
1/7/08,1/8/08) 
(4) Uncertainty Results .001 1.72 .791 11.23 -.0070 -2.47 .014 .400 -10.47 
(12/3/07 through 1/19/08) 
(5) Two Event Dates Results .001 1.01 .795 11.12 .0031 .40.687.382 .61 
(1/7/08,1/8/08) 
9
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ά 
.001 
ά(t) 
1.67 
β 
.791 
β(t) 
11.21 
δ1 
-.007 
δ1(t) 
-2.458 
δ1(p) 
.015 
δ1CAR% 
11.20 
δ2 
.0025 
δ2(t) 
.387 
δ2(p) 
.131 
δ2CAR% r2 
.50 .398 
where δ1 represents the "succession uncertainty" event of 12/3/07 to 
1/19/08 
and δ2 represents the "secrecy policy reversal" event of 1/7 and 1/8/08. 
Next, to empirically address research question 2, we tested for a 
policy reversal effect using the four dates identified above (days on 
which reversal of the secrecy policy was discussed in press articles). 
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as those 
of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested individually 
for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests address the 
joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both voluntary 
reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. Using the method described 
above, we tested for a secrecy policy reversal effect using December 5th, 
December 10th, January 7th, and January 8th. The results are given in 
Table 1, Panel A, Item 3 which shows no significant effect on the 
secrecy reversal variable for the dates with secrecy policy reversal 
references. Notably, the sign of the coefficient on the event variable is 
negative (-.0061). 
Using the data set and general model described above, we tested the 
hypothesis derived from research question 3: that an uncertainty-
increasing process began with the illness of Havemeyer and ended with 
the announced selection of Thomas. We employed a dummy variable for 
the dates of December 3rd, when Havemeyer's illness was first reported 
in the New York Times, through December 19th, the day before the Wall 
Street Journal announced W.B. Thomas's upcoming election as ASR 
president. We observe in Table 1, Panel A, Item 4 a highly significant 
effect (p. = .014) on the event days in the direction consistent with an 
uncertainty-increasing process (that is, negative). Using PSW's method 
of calculating the size of the abnormal return as the product of the 
dummy coefficient (-.0070) and the number of days in the event period 
(15), we find a cumulative abnormal return of -10.50%. Overall, this 
evidence is consistent with a picture of investors who became 
increasingly distressed by the uncertainty of management succession 
until the experienced W. B. Thomas was identified as H. O. 
Havemeyer's successor. As a further test of investor uncertainty during 
10
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this period, we compared an ASR market model using the period of 
September 30th 1907 through January 19th, 1908, with a model using 
a period of the same length immediately after. As shown in Table 2, 
ASR's beta increases from .786 to .963 in the two models, and their 
difference is marginally significant at alpha = . 10. 
Irrespective of the interpretation of the above results, they 
demonstrate that any model used for estimating ASR normal returns that 
includes the period from December 3rd through December 19th cannot 
assume beta stationarity; the inclusion of the period effectively 
incorporates a bias for rejecting a null hypothesis for any event date(s) 
proximately subsequent to that period. This occurs because the inclusion 
of the uncertainty-increasing period mathematically reduces the slope 
(coefficient) on the systematic (market) return. Given the evidence and 
findings described above, the PSW findings are reinforced by the 
occurrence of an event window that merely happened to fall following a 
period of significant negative abnormal returns included in the estimation 
period. Indeed, any event identified during the period immediately 
following the resolution of the succession issue would be biased towards 
the finding of positive abnormal returns for ASR investors. A second 
implication, as mentioned earlier, is that any policy reversal tests using 
event dates falling during this period could be confounded by the 
succession uncertainty effect. For this reason, our earlier results, which 
included two secrecy policy reversal event dates falling during this 
apparent succession uncertainty period, may be biased against finding a 
positive ASR abnormal return associated with a reversal in its secrecy 
policy1. 
1
 It is hard to have much confidence in these results. As described in the 
next section, tests reveal a negative security market response to the succession 
uncertainty accompanying the illness and death of Havemeyer, which 
potentially confounds any analysis including event days in the period from 
November 29th to December 20th. The policy reversal test described above 
includes the event dates of December 5th and December 10th. Further 
complicating any interpretation of our results, news articles on ASR on the 
two remaining days, December 7th and 8th, refer to both the secrecy policy 
reversal and other matters of potential importance. We have previously 
described the topics covered in the press on January 8th. The day before 
ASR's annual meeting (January 7th) The Wall Street Journal not only 
discussed the anticipated secrecy policy reversal, but based on favorable news 
about the sugar market and the favorable estimates made regarding ASR's 
financial results, the article declares ASR's "past fiscal year... was one of the 11
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We, therefore, respecified our model to include a separate dummy 
variable for the event dates falling in the succession uncertainty period 
and used only the event dates of January 7th and January 8th (we 
removed December 5th and 10th). The results, shown in Table 1, Panel 
B again suggest no effect of the secrecy policy reversal. The coefficient 
on the policy reversal variable is positive (.0025) but not significant, 
with an implied CAR of .50%. The succession uncertainty variable is 
negative (-.007) and significant (p = .015), with an implied CAR of -
11.2%. While this may appear odd, our investigation suggests that it 
may reflect (as reported by the financial press) C.A. Spreckels' 
published attack on ASR which appeared on that day. 
To test the sensitivity of the results to the separation of the 
succession uncertainty dates as a second event, we reran the analysis 
including the succession uncertainty dates as estimation dates (that is, 
along with all the other dates in the estimation period), continuing with 
January 7th and 8th as event dates. Table 1, Panel A, Item 5 shows a 
positive coefficient on the policy reversal variable that, while slightly 
larger than the result in Panel B, is still statistically insignificant. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, the results do not necessarily rule out that the positive 
wealth effect observed on January 8th for ASR shareholders resulted 
from ASR's reversal of its secrecy policy. However, our analysis of the 
events and context surrounding January 8th suggests the following. First, 
there were several disclosures with potential import to investors. While 
PSW are correct in their finding of an empirically measurable abnormal 
return on January 8th, it is difficult to know how much of this effect can 
be attributed to the official policy reversal announcement versus ASR's 
report of a good year, Cuban crop shortages, favorable government tariff 
policies, the methodological artifact stemming from the succession 
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death (nonstationary beta), or the 
secrecy policy reversal. There are, thus, several possible factors which 
may have contributed to the ASR abnormal return effect found by PSW 
on January 8th. 
Second, the financial press anticipated the reversal of the secrecy 
policy other dates. When included in an analysis, no positive abnormal 
best that the company has experienced..." 
12
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returns for those dates are found. However, these results may be suspect 
because the analysis includes event dates during the negative-return 
period that accompany the apparent succession uncertainty at the time 
of H.O. Havemeyer's death. Nevertheless, when controlling for the 
succession uncertainty dates and reducing the event dates to January 7th 
and 8th, we found no secrecy policy reversal event effect, even when 
including the succession uncertainty dates in the "normal return" 
estimation period. Yet even this result cannot be relied upon, as financial 
press articles attribute ASR stock price weakness on the 7th to C.A. 
Spreckels published criticism of ASR on that date. 
Finally, as mentioned just above, the positive abnormal return of 
January 8th is, in part, a statistical artifact resulting from the succession 
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death. During this period of 
succession uncertainty ASR returns were below market returns. The 
nonstationary beta confounds the interpretation of any event dates 
occurring during the succession uncertainty period (including some of the 
secrecy reversal policy dates), and mathematically biases any statistical 
analysis using this period in the window for estimating normal returns in 
favor of finding a positive abnormal return for immediately subsequent 
dates. 
We conclude that it is not possible with the present data and capital 
markets methods to empirically and statistically attribute ASR's positive 
abnormal returns to its reversal in its secrecy policy. Our objective, 
however, is not to disprove that ASR's secrecy policy reversal resulted 
in a stock price change. Rather, our point is to emphasize the importance 
in considering all the contextual factors salient to research focusing on 
historical time periods. This is particularly important when applying 
contemporary markets methods to data from such periods. Aside from 
issues of market efficiency during this period (Previts and Bricker, 
1994), the nature of historical data may frequently place some 
limitations on the drawing of conclusions, particularly when the data are 
scarce and the historical context of the events renders data interpretation 
ambiguous. Correspondingly, it may be in such instances that historical 
analysis can be a useful and tool for more fully investigating, 
interpreting, and augmenting the results of empirical work. In this way, 
modern capital markets method and historical analysis may prove to be 
valuable complements in studying historical time periods. 
It is helpful and desirable for accounting scholars to carefully 
construct research that applies contemporary methods to historical 
accounting data as a backdrop for considering present-day issues. 
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Empirical researchers are to be commended for conducting pioneering 
work in this area. Future research of this sort should continue to develop 
full and careful approaches to combining historical analysis with modern 
capital market methods, so that adequate consideration of the 
fundamental contextual factors can be used in the design of such 
research and in the interpretability of results. 
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Appendix A 
American Sugar Refining Prices 
November 1, 1907 through January 31, 1908 
Date 
11/1 
11/2 
11/4 
11/6 
11/7 
11/8 
11/9 
11/11 
11/12 
11/13 
11/14 
11/15 
11/16 
11/18 
11/19 
11/20 
11/21 
11/22 
11/23 
11/25 
11/26 
11/27 
11/29 
11/30 
12/2 
12/3 
12/4 
12/5 
12/6 
12/7 
12/9 
12/10 
12/11 
12/12 
12/13 
12/14 
12/16 
12/17 
12/18 
12/19 
12/20 
American 
Sugar 
100.625 
100.625 
104.000 
105.000 
103.625 
103.625 
103.625 
105.875 
104.500 
104.250 
101.875 
100.500 
101.250 
103.000 
101.125 
101.750 
101.000 
101.500 
103.000 
103.000 
104.000 
103.000 
103.750 
106.000 
107.750 
106.000 
106.500 
107.250 
107.750 
107.000 
105.000 
102.000 
98.375 
98.375 
94.125 
94.125 
95.625 
95.750 
96.250 
98.000 
100.000 
Dow Jones 
Railroad 
index Notes 
84.360 
84.140 
85.050 
85.720 
84.270 
85.090 
85.070 
85.910 
85.410 
84.800 
84.150 
82.500 
82.970 
84.600 
82.930 
82.380 
81.410 
81.490 
83.400 
81.720 
83.510 
84.090 
85.800 Havemeyer is ill 11/28 
87.130 
88.280 
87.320 Havemeyer illness reported in NY 
89.110 Havemeyer 
90.300 Havemeyer death reported. Secrecy 
90.560 reversal—date 1 
90.120 
89.190 
87.880 Secrecy policy reversal—date 2 
87.850 
87.850 
86.940 
87.760 
86.730 
86.610 
87.230 
87.390 
88.780 W.B. Thomas announced as 
Havermeyer successor 
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Date 
12/21 
12/23 
12/24 
12/26 
12/27 
12/28 
12/30 
12/31 
1/2/08 
1/3 
1/4 
1/6 
1/7 
1/8 
1/9 
1/10 
1/11 
1/13 
1/14 
1/15 
1/16 
1/17 
1/18 
1/20 
1/21 
1/22 
1/23 
1/24 
1/25 
1/27 
1/28 
1/29 
1/30 
1/31 
American 
Sugar 
100.125 
99.125 
98.750 
96.875 
100.250 
99.250 
100.875 
99.500 
101.375 
107.000 
106.250 
106.500 
104.750 
107.000 
108.250 
108.250 
110.250 
112.250 
113.375 
113.250 
112.125 
113.625 
113.625 
113.250 
111.000 
112.375 
111.875 
111.500 
113.500 
113.500 
114.500 
112.500 
113.500 
114.250 
Dow Jones 
Railroad 
index Notes 
89.350 
88.110 
87.610 
87.010 
88.410 
88.350 
89.500 
88.770 
89.810 
90.380 
90.370 
91.120 
91.150 Secrecy policy reversal—date 3 
90.820 Annual Meeting. Secrecy policy 
92.860 —date 4 
92.030 
93.750 
94.270 
95.060 
95.100 
94.680 
95.270 
95.750 
94.670 
93.090 
92.760 
92.460 
91.660 
92.220 
92.730 
93.400 
92.400 
92.440 
92.190 
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Appendix B 
Pertinent Articles from the Wall Street Journal 
1. "Features of the Market" extract - dates as noted: 
Wed. 12/04/07 "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious 
illness of H. O. Havemeyer. Washington has been selling 
a little of the stock lately, which has often shown some 
tendency to sell off about the time of the meeting of 
Congress. American Sugar, however, has been very 
much out of politics for a long time past." 
Fri. 12/06/07 "The first transaction in American Sugar was one point 
below the closing sale of the previous day on President 
Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss to the 
company is a very serious one, as he raised it from the 
most sensational gambling counter in the unlisted 
department to one of the best held and distributed 
industrial stocks in the market." 
Wed. 12/11/07 ". . . Sugar also was subjected to considerable pressure. 
There was a poor market in it..." 
Thurs. 12/12/07 "Inquiry from people in close touch with the Havemeyer 
family and the American Sugar situation disposes of any 
rumors of a change in the holding of the stock arising out 
of the death of the president. The selling, however comes 
through conservative commission houses, and in the 
opinion of specialists does not indicate a short position of 
any consequence. It is naturally based upon the very 
tangible loss the company has sustained in H. O. 
Havemeyer's death, and represents investment holdings." 
Fri. 12/13/07 "American Sugar opened active and higher. H. Content 
who is thought to have sold something like 25,000 shares 
on Wednesday, was reported active in making a market, 
helped by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock. It used to 
be one of the best trading industrials on the board, and 
the present opportunity is considered favorable for 
reviving interest." 
18
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"Halsted & Hodges, who were among the heavy sellers of 
stocks in the early trading of Wednesday, sold American 
Sugar and Amalgamated Copper in considerable quantity 
on the opening strength. Traders called this good 
selling, and took it to be long stock." 
"American Sugar showed the severest break in the 
industrial list, losing over 4 points. . ." 
"Houses which used to do a good deal of business for 
lower Wall Street when American Sugar was the most 
active industrial on the list, have been selling that stock. 
Some of this is probably for shorts." 
"There was renewed pressure in American Sugar at the 
outset, with selling by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the 
stock, CD. Barney & Co., and other influential 
commission houses. Boston has been selling the stock 
since H.O. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result, 
as investors there had great faith in the late president. 
One disturbing factor, however, in the market has been 
some selling from Washington in the past few days." 
Trade interests seem to be the principal bears in American 
Sugar. One view is that the short crop will hurt earnings. 
The fact possibly that trade enemies of the company see a 
chance of retaliation for the Havemeyer attitude towards 
them in past years." 
Fri. 12/20/07 "American Sugar, after opening quiet, advanced a point 
and a half in the first ten minutes. Traders began to suspect 
from the beginning of the week that short selling was being 
encouraged, and a sharp demand for the stock in the loan 
crowd on Wednesday confirmed this view. The 
Washington houses have been borrowers of the stock." 
Mon. 12/23/07 "There was some disposition to test the strength of 
American Sugar, but J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock, 
had buying orders, and seemed able to support it without 
much difficulty. It is well and widely held, and soon 
becomes oversold." 
Sat. 12/14/07 
Mon. 12/16/07 
Wed. 12/18/07 
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Tues. 12/24/07 "Traders think that a little of the American Sugar bought to 
support in the recent decline has been coming out quietly. 
Lower Wall Street advices are bearish, but such speculators 
do not seem to have made much by their preliminary 
campaign after H.O. Havemeyer's death." 
Fri. 12/27/07 "With very little pressure Sugar disclosed a rather weak 
technical position. There is no doubt that the rally to par 
forced in most of the shorts. The bear talk still comes from 
lower Wall Street, and it looked as if a little long stock were 
coming to the market, to judge by its more frequent 
appearance in loans." 
"The selling of Sugar in the forenoon was taken as 
indicating that the New Street bear party was trying to 
make an active market. S.L. Blood & Co. and E. F. Hutton 
& Co. were conspicuous among the sellers, while the 
specialists supported." 
Sat. 12/28/07 "Bear points on American Sugar were again current. They 
have reference to the election of the new president on Jan. 
8, when lower Wall Street believes some permanent 
difference among leading holders as to policy may make 
itself felt." 
Sat. 1/04/08 "One reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real 
scarcity of the stock. It loaned at 1.64 premium in the first 
hour, and has been in demand flat in the loan crowd for 
some time past. It was always a dangerous short sale, and 
was oversold when H.O. Havemeyer died." 
Wed. 1/08/08 "American Sugar was 2 points lower at the opening on the 
violent attack by Claus A. Spreckles published in a morning 
paper. While the Street does not regard him as altogether 
impartial witness, traders admit that the attack is the most 
formidable made upon the stock in many years." 
Thurs. 1/09/08 " . . . Speculators who attacked American Sugar on the 
protests of Mr. Spreckles found a market which was too 
much for them, and probably took losses during the course 
of the day..." 
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2. Additional Articles - dates and titles as noted: 
Tues. 12/03/07 "Answers to Inquires" 
An investing advice column states: " . . . [American] Sugar 
stock is in danger of being adversely affected by an 
industrial slow-up, and also by agitation of the tariff 
question." 
Thurs. 12/05/07 "H. O. Havemeyer" 
Announcement of the death of H. O. Havemeyer: " . . . 
Under his control the American Sugar Refinery Co. has 
. made a remarkable record of profitable operation. Mr. 
Havemeyer's methods imparted steadiness and efficiency to 
his corporation, but his policy was not that of publicity, so 
that he belonged to a passing rather than to a new era of 
corporate finance." 
"H. O. Havemeyer Dead" 
Provides a brief biographical sketch of H. O. Havemeyer. 
Fri. 12/06/0 "American Sugar Refining Co." 
Article downplays the impact of H. O. Havemeyer's 
death:"While the removal of death of Henry O. Havemeyer, 
founder and president of the American Sugar Refining Co., 
for between sixteen and seventeen years, is a loss which is 
bound to be severely felt, the splendid organization which 
had been perfected under his leadership, in the opinion of 
those most familiar with its affairs, has gathered sufficient 
momentum to carry forward the business without 
interruption or diminution of prosperity.. ." 
Tues. 12/10/07 "American Sugar Refining Co.: Havemeyer's Death 
Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy Policy" 
Article predicts more open communication with 
stockholders. 
Wed. 12/11/07 "Dividends and Meetings" 
"The directors of the American Sugar Refining Co. have 
elected Horace Havemeyer, a director of the company to 
succeed his father, H. O. Havemeyer, deceased. Vice-
President Thomas was appointed acting President until the 
next annual meeting, Jan 8. 
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Appropriate resolutions were passed by the board regarding 
the death of Mr. Havemeyer." 
Mon. 12/16/07 "American Sugar Refining: Trade and Company 
Conditions Good" 
"Secretary Heike, of the American Sugar Refining Co., 
says: "The condition of the sugar trade and of the company 
is very good. We are doing a normal business for this 
season of the year, and the general business recession has 
not as yet affected the sugar market. The sugar crop is a 
little short this year.' 
In the sugar trade it is stated that there is no apparent cause 
for the selling of sugar stock. The American Sugar 
refineries are all running. Its sugar accumulations are 
sufficient for thirty days, and of these, 50,000 tons were 
bought by Mr. Havemeyer shortly before his death, at the 
lowest prices current for sugar for the year and as l/4c. 
below present values, which transaction netted a profit of 
$200,000. 
The company's purchases of sugar in October and 
November show their cost was below present value. The 
total stocks of all refiners is only 100,000 tons. 
Mr. Thomas, the acting president, has been in the 
management for many years and has wide knowledge of the 
sugar trade. 
It is said the financial results for the present fiscal year are 
the best that the company has yet experienced. The profits 
from the Beet Sugar industry along are said to have 
increased fully 25%." 
Tues. 12/17/07 "American Sugar Refining Co. Again Center of 
Interest" 
"Not for years has the American Sugar Refining stock been 
so active as during the past week when over 107,000 shares 
changed hands at prices ranging from 106 1/2 to 92 3/4, the 
latter being the lowest point recorded in years. 
Considerable interest has been aroused as to the causes of 
this activity, and all the more so, since the company's 
officials maintain the trade is normal for this time of year, 
and that conditions, generally, are favorable. Injustice to 
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the 17,000 stockholders it should be pointed out that in the 
sugar trade there is utmost confidence as to the future. The 
crop is a little short of last year's crop, but on the other 
hand much better prices prevail. 
For the fiscal year, about to close, it is believed, and there 
is sufficient ground for so doing, that the earnings will be 
larger that in any year heretofore. .. . 
. . . One reason advanced for the marked decline in the 
stock is the loss of H. O. Havemeyer, which, if be true, is 
indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the 
American Sugar Refining Co. The company was 
apparently too well organized for such to have a radical 
effect, though it undoubtably did occasion considerable 
selling." 
Wed. 12/18/07 "American Sugar" 
"Many thousand shares of American Sugar common have 
been picked up by individual investors on the decline to 92 
3/4, and in the cause of several Boston houses, Sugar 
buying last week was the investment feature..." 
Fri. 12/20/07 "American Sugar" 
".. . The notice states that proxies will be voted for the re-
election of Messrs. Parsons and Frazier and the election of 
Horace Havemeyer to succeed his father. It is the intention 
of the board, as Mr. Heike [Secretary], at the annual 
election of the officers after the stockholders meeting, to 
elect W. B. Thomas as president of the company." 
Tues. 1/07/08 "American Sugar Refining Co. Completes a Successful 
Year" 
"The American Sugar Refining Co.'s past fiscal year, 
which will be reviewed at the annual meeting on 
Wednesday, Jan 8., was one of the best that the company 
has experienced. . . 
With the inauguration of the new management it is 
supposed that the policy of the company will change, the 
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic 
and less secret. It is presumed that the various lawsuits 
inherited from the Havemeyer regime will be adjudicated. 
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. . . The strength of the stock in the past week, during 
which it showed a net gain of seven points, is attributable 
to various causes. Primarily, the crop is smaller than last 
year's. This in itself, is sufficient cause for the higher 
prices prevailing... Another bull point as far as the stock 
is concerned is the spread of the labor troubles in Cuba. 
Still another factor pointed to with considerable satisfaction 
by the sugar traders is the attitude of Secretary Taft taken 
in regard to the duty on sugar and the regulation of the 
supply from the Philippines. . ." 
Wed. 1/08/08 "American Sugar" 
"The officers of the American Sugar Refining Co. brand the 
Spreckel's charges against the Sugar Co. as utterly absurd. 
Acting President Thomas says, 'The story is, of course, 
untrue,' and Secretary Heike is equally emphatic in denying 
the truth of the account. 
Friends of the American Sugar Refining Co. in the sugar 
trade admit that more publicity in regard to the company's 
affairs would be better policy. The new management has 
already committed itself to more open and less antagonistic 
methods. President Thomas has given his word to this 
effect. It will however, take some time to bring about this 
result completely but the first step in this direction is 
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President 
Thomas may in his review of the year disclose more 
information that has been given out heretofore." 
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